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ABSTRACT
The paper presents results from a labor supply study on Swedish
data. The estimated labor supply model is based on a new methodological
approach. This approach is well suited for taking into account complex non-
linear and non-convex budget constraints, unobservable institutional con-
straints on hours as well as joint labor supply decisions of married
couples. The model is estimated on Swedish data from 1981. The resulting
wage elasticities of total labor supply turn out to be numerically small.
The model is used to simulate the effects on labor supply, income
distribution and costs of taxation from replacing the 1981 tax system by a
system with proportional and lump-sum taxes. The impact on labor supply is
shown to be substantial despite the fact that wage elasticites are small.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the results of en empirical analysis of labor
supply in Sweden based on a new modeling approach. This approach was intro-
duced by Dagsvik and Strom (1990) and employed on Norwegian data. The moti-
vation behind the development of the new approach is that we wish to take
into account complicated non-convex budget sets. The Hausman type approach
(see Hausman, 1980) is in general intractable in this case since it has
only proved practical for simple labor supply functions (mostly linear) and
simple non-convex budget constraint.
There are several features of our model that distinguishes it from
previous empirical labor supply models with taxes. First, as mentioned
above, it is designed to deal with non-linear labor supply functions and
complicated non-convex budget sets for two-person households. Second, it
accounts for latent restrictions on hours. Regulations by law, wage-hours
contracts in unionized economies and demand constraints restrict the hours
decisions of the individual. These restrictions are reflected in the ob-
served frequencies of hours worked with a typical two-peak distribution for
females (full time/part time) and a one-peak distribution for males. Most
likely, these concentrations are due to restrictions on the choice set of
hours of work.
Third, the model is an household model in the sense that the
optimal decisions of hours worked by the husband and the wife is assumed to
follow from the maximization of a joint utility function. Thus, the pos-
sible endogeneity bias introduced by the assumption of an exogeneously
given income of the spouse is avoided.
Previous labor supply studies in Sweden are Axelsson et al. (1981),
Gustafsson and Jacobsson (1983) and Blomquist (1983, 1988, 1989). In Axels-
son et al. hours are analysed, but taxes are not explicitly accounted for.
Gustafsson and Jacobsson analyze female participation, also without taxes.
Blomquist (1988) applies the Hausman approach with linear labor supply
function. In Blomquist (1989) a quadratic deterministic supply function is
applied which represents a very strong a priori restriction. No restriction
on hours are specified in these models and the income of the spouse is
taken as given when the male (Blomquist, 1983 and 1988) and the female
(Blomquist, 1988) labor supply is estimated. The latter can introduce an
endogeneity bias, see Blundell and Meghir (1984 ).
A brief, but self-contained, description of the model is given in
Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 deals with the data and Section 5 with the
estimation results. In Section 6 we report the results of various policy
simulations in order to demonstrate how taxes affect behavior.
2. THE MODEL
For expository simplicity we consentrate on one person households
in the present section. The individual is assumed to choose from a set of
"packages" called matches. A match is defined as a particular combination
of skills offered (by the individual) and qualifications required to
perform specific tasks. The individual is assumed to maximize his utility
with respect to matches given his opportunities and budget constraints. We
assume that the individual has perfect knowledge about his opportunities,
but due to unobserved heterogeneity across individuals the set of feasible
matches is viewed as random by the econometrician.
Let z=1,2,..., be an enumeration of the matches. Match z is charac-
terized by fixed hours of work, H(z), wage rate, 14(z), qualifications de-
manded, T2 (z), and skills offered, T3 (z). For non-market matches, H(z)=
W(z)=T2 (z)=T3 (z)=0.
The individual's economic budget constraint, conditional on match
z, is given by
(2.1) 	C = C(z) E f(H(z)W(z)+I)
where C is consumption, I is nonlabor income and f( • ) is the function that
transforms gross income to income after tax. The form of the function f
depends on the tax system and of the rules of social security payments,
etc. It may be non-differentiable, non-concave, even discontinuous. Let
(2.2) 	 T i (z) = 0(T2(z),T3(z))
where OH is a "distance" function in the sense that it attains low value
to matches where the difference between skills offered and demanded is
large.
The individual's utility function is assumed to have the form
(2.3 ) 	U(C,h,z) = v(C,h,T 1 (z)) + c(z)
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where v(C,h,t) is a deterministic function that is quasi-concave in (h,C),
decreasing in h and increasing in C for fixed t. e(z) is a random variable
that is supposed to account for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. More-
over, the utility function is supposed to depend on how well the individual
is fit for the match measured through T i (z).
As mentioned above the collection of matches feasible to the indi-
vidual is random to the econometrician and consequently the set of feasible
attributes and tasteshifters, 11-1(z),W(z),T(z),c(z)}, where T(z)=(T i (z),
T2 (z)) is random. Specifically, we assume that {H(z),W(z),T(z),c(z)) are
the points of a Poisson process on [0,1i]x[0,i]x[0,1] 2 xR with intensity
measure
(2.4a) W(h,w,t 1 ,t 2 )dhdwdt 1 dt 2 • e
_e
de
for market matches and
(2.4b) W(0,0,0,0)e-6de
when h=w=t i =t = . Eq. (2.4a) means that the probability that a match for
which
(H(z)E(h,h+dh),W(z)e(w,w+dw),T(z)E(t,t+dt),c(z)E(c,e+de), =(t ,t 2 )
is feasible, is equal to
X(h,w,t i ,t )dhdwdt 1 dt 2 • e-cdc + o(dhdwdt 1 dt 2 dc).
We assume that
(2.5a) W(h,w,t ,t ) = Pg1g2(h)g3(wIt2)g4(t )g5(t )
and
(2.5b) W(0,0,0,0) = p(1-g 1 )
where p>0 is a constant, g 1 E[0,1], g 2 (h), g 3 (wit 2 ), g4 (t 1 ) and g 5 (t ) are
probability densities. As demonstrated in Dagsvik and Strom (1990), g (h)
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and g3 (wit2 ) can be interpreted as the densities of feasible hours and
wages (given required qualifications) offered by the firms, while g4 (t 1 )
and g 5 (t 2 ) are the densities of distance and qualifications, respectively.
The interpretation of g l is as the fraction of feasible matches that are
market matches. The particular decomposition (2.5a) means that offered
hours and wages are independent. Offered hours are independent of {T(z)}
and wages are independent of {T i ( z)}. These assumptions are justified as
follows: Offered hours of work are often determined by the nature of the
tasks to be performed and by institutional regulations independent of wages
and individual and firm-specific characteristics. The assumption that
g3 (wIt 2 ) does not depend on t 1 may be more difficult to defend since one
may claim that offered wages may depend on how well the individual is fit
for the job. However, if we let g 3 (wIt2 ) also depend on t 1 we run into
serious identification problems. Anyhow we believe that the main wage de-
terminants are the qualifications represented by {T2 (z)}. Note, however,
that there still can be dependence between realized hours and wages as a
result of choices made by the individuals.
Let us now consider the realized hours and wage distribution in the
market. Let cp(h,w) be the probability density of the realized hours of work
and wages i.e., the hours-wage combination that correspond to the match
that yields the highest utility. According to Dagsvik (1988) the Poisson
process assumption and (2.4) imply that
(2.6a) T(h,w
ffeliq h,w,t i ) mh,w,t 1 ,t 2 )dt 1 dt2
ifffeW(x ' Y ' t1 4(x,y,t 1 ,t 2 )dxdydt dt 2 +e14/(0 ' 0 ' 0)-A(0,0,0,0)
for h>0, w>0, t 1 >0, t 2 >0 and
(2.6b T(0,0) jusselAA,J, 
01(0,0, °)-A(0 0 0 2 0)   
4(x,y,t 1 ,t 2 )dxdydt 1 dt2+0 0 ' 0 0)-A(0,0 0,0)
where
(2.7) 	 w(h,w,t i ) = v(f(hw+I),h,t ).
The probability density (2.6) of realized hours and wages depends
on the preferences as well as on the choice opportunities. This is not in
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accordance with the conditions of perfect equilibrium, which require that
the (empirical) distribution of realized hours and wages coincides with the
(empirical) distribution of preferred hours and wages. To assume that every
realization equals equilibrium values is rather restrictive since it ex-
cludes the possibility of minor market imperfections and noise affecting
realized hours and wages. A less restrictive assumption is to assume equa-
lity between the theoretical distributions of preferred and realized hours
and wages. This means that the corresponding empirical distributions will
not necessarily coincide in small samples. In Dagsvik and Strom op.cit.
this latter equilibrium concept is denoted quasi-equilibrium (QE). QE
implies that hours, wages and skills adjust so that the probability density
of realized hours and wages depend solely on the preference terms.
In the real world there are, however, more severe imperfections.
Examples are institutional restrictions imposed by unions and government on
hours and wages. These restrictions prevent the equilibrating process, even
of the "large sample" type alluded to above, to take place. Hence, a model
of labor supply should allow for a possible deviation between the distribu-
tions of realized and preferred hours and wages. In our model we do this by
postulating a partial QE. By this we understand that wages adjust so as to
give QE within groups of matches. A group is identified by a specific level
of (H(z),T(z)). We thus assume that the conditional distribution of rea-
lized wages, given hours and attributes {T(z)}, depends solely on prefe-
rences. This implies that the wage rate must be a function of individual
qualifications. It can then be shown that under partial QE (2.6) implies
that
(2.8) 	 W(z) = W(T2 (z))
where W(.) is a function that satisfies
(2.9) 	 g3 (4t 2 )t 2 ) = 1/i4.
Thus if (2.8) holds the density of offered wages conditional on
qualifications (as measured by T2 (z)) is uniform.
From (2.8) and (2.9) it follows that the unconditional wage density 
across qualification groups take the form
h,w) = log(fexp(ijgh,w,t 1 ))g4 (t 1 )dt 1 )
ev(C,0,0)
v ( C,O , t1)






(2.10) g(w) = g5(t2(w)) 
cli2 (w)  
dw •     
where t2 (.) is the inverse mapping of W(•). By inserting (2.10 ) into (2.6)
we get the realized hours and wage density under partial QE;
(2.11a) 	 (h,w
for h>0, w>0 and
(2.11b) Fp 0,0
g 1 exp(qh,w))g 2 (h)g(w)
g 1 5fexP(qx,y))g 2 (x)g(y)dxdy+K(1-g )exp )41 0,0))
K(1-g 1 )exp((0,0))
g 1 ffexp(qx,y))g 2 (x)g(y)dxdy+K 1-Mexp((0 0))
The interpretation of K is as a parameter that accounts for the
value of non-market matches relative to the value of the market matches
evaluated at h=0. In general K may depend on C (evaluated at h=0), but in
the empirical specification made below K reduces to a constant.
Note that g l and g2 (h) in (2.11) accounts for the possible market
imperfections associated with job availability ("unemployment") and offered
hours in partial QE.
3. EXTENSION OF THE MODEL TO TWO-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS (MARRIED COUPLES)
The decision problem of a married couple is to determine jointly
the labor supply of the wife and of the husband as well as the level of
consumption of the household, subject to the budget and hours constraints.
Let U(C,h F ,hm ,z) denote the household's utility function where h F
and hm denote the wife's and the husband's hours of work, respectively. C
is total consumption of the household and z = (zF ,zm ) indexes the matches
of the wife, zF , and husband, zm , respectively.
The constraints are given by
(3.1) 	 (h F ,hm ) = (H F (z),H ( 
)),
( 3 . 2 ) 	 C(z) = f(H F (z)W F (z),Hm (z)Wm (z),I
where HF (z), WF (z), Hm (z) and Wm (z) are the match-specific hours of work
and wages for the wife and for the husband, respectively. Consumption is
defined by
(3.3) 	 C = f(wm hm ,wF h F ,I
where I denotes capital income and f( • ) is the function that transforms
gross income into consumption. In the calculation of f(.) for alternative
values of h i , j=M,F, the details of the tax structure of 1981 are taken
into account.
As above (TiF (z),Tim (z)) represents the "distance" between qualifi-
cations offered and demanded relative to wife and husband.
Under assumptions that are straight forward extensions of the
assumptions of the preceding section we can write
(3.4) 	 U(C(z),HF(z),Hm(z),z) = v(C(z),HF(z),Hm(z),T1F(z),T1m(z)) + c(z
where [HF (z),Hm (z),WF (z),Wm (z),T 1F (z),T1m (z),c(z)} is an enumeration of the
points of a Poisson process on 10[0,1] 2 XR. .
The Swedish data contains no observations of education which
implies that we cannot analyse participation. However, the Swedish partici-
pation rates, even for females, are very high (close to 90 percent) corn
pared to other countries. Moreover, these restrictions on data means that
we can at most estimate conditional densities, i.e., densities given the
wage. The conditional density of hours given the realized wage is
(3.5 ) 	 gh ,h wF
g2F (hF)g2m(hm)exp(T(hF,hm,wF,wm))
ffg2F ix)g2m (y)expaqx,y,wF ,wm ))dxdy
where
(3.6) 	 i(h ,hm ,wF ,wm ) 	 logffexp(v(f(h F wF ,hm wm




Data used in this study is a subsample from the Swedish Income Dis-
tribution Survey 1981 (HINK), collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics
in Sweden. These annual and representative cross section surveys contain
primary data from two rolling panels. Besides filled-in tax returns checked
and approved by the tax authorities there are survey data based on inter-
views with both spouses. Moreover, data also contains information from the
municipalities and the social security authorities. HINK-81 covers about
9 600 households and 24 500 individuals.
An HINK-household either consists of two adults and their children
or one adult with or without children. An 18 years old person (or older) is
defined as an adult. Married people are considered as adults, no matter
their age. Cohabitants are defined as HINK-households provided that they
are old enough to be adults.
The data set includes married couples or cohabitants with labor and
capital income. Households with business income only or income from agri-
culture are excluded. The data set covers only working individuals.
In our subsample the age of women is between 26 and 65, while men
are not older than 65. Couples of which one or both spouses have hourly
wage rates below SEK 10 and above SEK 170, and with hours above 3 600 are
excluded from the sample.
The income variable used is income from work, including sickness
and parental benefits. Annual hours worked are calculated as hours worked a
week times number of weeks worked during the year. The way hours are mea-
sured means that they correspond to contracted hours or normal working
hours rather than to the actual hours worked. The advantage of using con-
tracted hours (overtime included) is that one avoids unpredictable fluctua-
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tions due to sick-leaves. Economic theory has hardly anything to contribute
in how sick-leaves occur and sick leaves have definitly nothing to do in a
labor supply context. The hourly wage rate is calculated as income from
work divided by hours worked a year. Dividing local income taxes paid by
local taxable income yields the local tax rate.
The non-taxable allowances included in disposable income are the
following:
- received transfers for childrens allowances,
- housing allowances,
- welfare payments,
- allowances for children between 16 and 18 that study,
- several kinds of pensions, life annuities and sickness benefits,
- several payments while serving in the military.
Of these allowances the housing allowances and the welfare payments
depend on income.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for the 1 649 households used
in the estimation of the model.
Part-time fractions, females
30 h/week
20 h/week 	 •
	.11 	 .32 	0	 1.0
	
.16 	 .37 	 0 	 1.0
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
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Table 1. Sample statistics of married couples
Variables 	 Mean 	 St.dev. 	 Min 	 Max
Annual hours
Males ...................... 	 2 021 	 327 	 240 	 3 484
Females • • • • • • • • .• •• • • • • • • • • • • 	 1 542 	 516 	 120 	 3 286
Full-time fractions
Males
Females 	 • •
• • • • • • • • • • •	.69 	 .46 	0	 1.0
	
.30 	 .46 	 0 	 1.0
Hourly wage rates, SEK
Males
Females 	 • • •
• • • • 	 • 55 	 22 	 11 	 163
42 	 15 	 11 	 167
Gross annual earnings, SEK
Males ............... ... ........... 	 110 000 	 47 000 	 0 	 639 000
Females ........ 	 ..,............. 	 63 000 	 27 000 	 17 000 	 255 000
Marginal tax rates, pct.
Males .................... . • • • • • 	 63 	 14 	 22 	 85
Females .. ......................... 	 47 	 14 	 6 	 88
Age
Males .... .4— 	 .... 	 .......... 	 44 	 10 	 22 	 64
Females 	 ••••••••••••••••••• 	 41 	 9 	 27 	 63
Household characteristics
Annual net taxes paid, 1000 SEK ... 	 61 	 35 	 3 	 407
Disposable income, 1000 SEK ..... • • 	 117 	 30 	 31 	 310
Number of children below 7 .... • 	 .38 	 .65 	 0 	 3
Number of children 7-17 ..... • • . . • • 	 .80 	 .92 	 0 	 7
5. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
As noted in Section 2 we have estimated the conditional model given
realized wage rates and given household characteristics that are supposed
to influence the preferences and the qualifications. The observed vari-
ables that are supposed to influence preferences are age and number of
children in the household less than 6 and above 6 years •
In order to estimate the model we need to specify functional forms
for ;:i(C,h F ,hm ), g3 (h) and g3F (h ) where
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V(C,h F ,hm ) log[ffexp(v(C,h F ,h ,t im ,tiF ))g4 (t i t i )dt im dt i d.
We have chosen V(C,h F ,hm ) to be a Box-Cox type function, separable
in leisure and consumption. This specification has been applied by several
researchers and allows for fairly flexible income and substitution elasti-
cities. Specifically
(5.1 C,hF,hM) =
( 	-J(00-5 C-0.3) a1 -1)1/4A2 	 Lma31 + a5 1 ogAma3
LF a7 -1
+ a6 (logAm ) 2 ) 	 cx7 	 (a8 + as 1 ogAF 	 o ( 1 ogAF ) 2
0. 	 0.
+ a11 CU6 + ai2 C06) + ai3L5aF 	
5a 
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where AF ,Am are the age of the wife and the husband, respectively, CU6 and
C06 are number of children less than 6 and above 6 years, C is given by
(3.3), Lk is leisure for gender k = M,F, defined as
Lk = i - hk /8760,
and aj , j = 1,2,...13, are unknown parameters. If a i <1, a3 <1, a7 <1, a2 >Ò,
a4 + a5 1 ogAm + a6 (logAm ) 2 >
and
a6 + a9 logAF + a1o(logAF)2 	 a1106 + a12 C06 > 0
then V(C,h F ,hm ) is increasing in C, decreasing in (h ,h m ) for fixed C and
strictly concave in (C,h F ,hm ).
The tax rules of 1981 used in estimating the model are ,described in
detail in Anderson et al (1988).
The densities of offered hours, g 3 "), k=F,M, are assumed uniform
except for a peak at full-time hours for males and peaks at full-time, 2/3
part-time and part-time hours for females. Unless this or analogous assump-
tions are made about the opportunity densities it is not possible to sepa-
rate all the structural coefficients in the mean utility function from the
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parameters of the opportunity densities for hours. Note that uniformly dis-
tributed offered hours is in accordance with the conditions of a perfect
competitive economy. Thus, the peaks in the hours distribution capture in-
stitutional restrictions and hence market imperfections in economy.
It is of interest to note that since the logarithm of the opportu-
nity density of hours and the mean utility function enter symmetrically
into (3.5) it would, however, be possible to interpret the peaks as stem-
ming from preferences in which case the offered hours could be generated by
a uniform distribution. Although this seems unlikely we can perform policy
simulations with respect to changes in demographic variables, taxes and
wage rates based on the estimated model that are consistent with either
interpretations. A necessasy requirement is that preferences and the oppor-
tunity density of hours are kept fixed.
The estimation is based on a procedure suggested by McFadden (1978)
which yields results that are close to the full information maximum likeli-
hood method. We are not able to use the exact likelihood function to esti-
mate the model because the evaluation of the integrals in (3.5) would be
too costly and cumbersome. The estimation procedure applied replaces the
double integral in the denominators of the densities by a sum over 30,
(alternatively 70), random points, where each term is adjusted by appropri-
ate weights. In other words, the continuous logit model is replaced by a
discrete logit version. McFadden has demonstrated that this method yields
consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates. We found the
McFadden estimation procedure to be remarkably efficient. Our experience
suggests that it is enough to replace the choice set by 10 random points
(draws in R/) to obtain good results. When the number of draws increases to
30 then the estimated standard errors seem to be close to the corresponding
ones obtained by the full maximum likelihood procedure.
The results of the estimation are reported in table
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Table 2. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the
opportunity density















































































Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined (apart
from the cross leisure term) and they have the theoretically expected
signs.
The estimates imply that the mean utility function is an increasing
and strictly concave function in consumption and leisure. The males margi-
nal mean utility of leisure attains a minimum at the age of 41.9 years and
in the case of females, at the age of 35 years.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 give the observed and simulated distributions
for hours of work and consumption. These figures demonstrate that the model








Figure 1. Observed and simulated hours of work for females
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In Table 3 we report what we have called aggregate Cournot elasti-
cities. They are calculated as follows: The model is used to simulate
(stochastic simulations) the labor supply for each household (wife and hus-
band) under the current regime and when the wage rates are increased by 10
per cent. The aggregate elasticity of, for example, female labor supply is
obtained by calculating the relative change in the mean (over all females
in the sample) female labor supply that results from a 1 per cent wage in-
crease. Note that the "estimates" in Table 3 are based on 10 sets of simu-
lations and that the standard deviations inform about the simulation uncer-
tainty. The Slutsky elasticities are derived in the same manner, but under
the restriction that utility levels should remain unchanged.
Table 3. Aggregate labor supply elasticities * ) for males and females
Male elasticities 	 Female elasticities
Type of elasticity
	
Own wage 	 Cross 	 Own wage 	 Cross
elasticities 	 elasticities 	 elasticities 	 elasticities
	.054 (.018)	 -.038 (.018) 	 .069 (.082) 	 -.031 (.018)
II 	 -.025 (.002) 	 -.019 (.003) 	 034 (.010) 	 -.067 (.007)
	Cournot III -.047 (.009) 	 -.024 (.011) 	 -0.37 (.022) 	 -.072 (.026)
Elasticity of
conditional 	 IV 	 -.020 (.001) 	 -.021 (.002) 	 .070 (.006) 	 -.065 (.008)
expectation of
total supply 	 I 	 .049 (.013) 	 -.038 (.024) 	 .813 (.105) 	 .026 (.044)
of hours 	 II 	 -.009 (.002) 	 -.005 (.002) 	 .062 (.009) 	 -.004 (.003)
Slutsky III 	 -.031 (.010) 	 -.006 (.006) 	 -.005 (.017) 	 -.017 (.025)
IV 	 -.006 (.002) 	 -.008 (.002) 	 .105 (.007) 	 -.003 (.005)
*) Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Note that I 	 = 10 per cent poorest households
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of disposable income
III = 10 per cent richest households
IV = all households
The aggregate elasticities in Table 3 indicate that labor supply is
rather inelastic. The conditional Cournot and Slutsky elasticities demon-
strate, however, that the labor supply responses depend on the households
disposable incomes. Both female and male members of the poor households in-
crease their hours of work, while the members of the rich households reduce
their hours of work as a result of wage increments.
A striking result in Table 3 is that the wage elasticities are de-
dining with household income and that some of the elasticities are nega-
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tive. The elasticities among the pooreit are positive while they are nega-
tive among the richest.
As reported above the deterministic part of the utility function
or, more precisely, the mean utility across feasible matches for given w
and h, is a concave function in C and h. However, the presence of random
tasteshifters (c(z)) and latent constraint on hours opens for the possibi-
lity of negative aggregate Slutsky elasticities.
6. POLICY SIMULATION
This section describes the nature and the purpose of the simulation
experiments. It should be noted that our model is a labor supply model
which treats wages as exogeneous variables. Hence we are only able to
perform conditional simulation experiments, given the wage distribution or
given specified changes in wage levels.
Let V(h F ,hm ,wF ,wm ) denote the value of the utility function when
individuals have maximized utility with respect to non-pecuniary attributes
given specified levels of hours and wages, i.e.
(6.1) 	 V(h F ,hm ,wF ,wm ) = 	 max (v(C(z),H ( ),H m (z TiF(Z ,Tim (z)) + c(z)).
given
	
	 HF (z)=h F ,Hm (z)=hm
WE(z)=wF , Wm(z)=wm
Replacing h F and h m in (6.1) by the stochastic counterparts it can
be demonstrated that
V(HF (z),Hm (z),wF ,w ) 	 IT(HF(z),Hm(z),wF(z),w (z)) + i(z
where IT is defined by (3.6), g means equality in distribution and where





Since we have estimated g2F (h F ),g2m (hm ) and #1171(h F ,hm ,wF ,wm ) we are
able to perform policy simulations (changes in tax rates) given the wage
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rate and given that the couple works provided it makes sense to keep the
opportunity densities 4a (h ) 	 a (h) and g4 (tiF ,tim ) unchanged. Recall,2F%-Fit- 	 M%-M,
that the densities of offered hours is assumed to be determined by institu-
tional constraints and firm-specific hours of work regulations. These con-
straints are not likely to change as a consequence of say, changes in the
tax system.
To keep 94 (t iF ,tim ) constant in the simulations means that the
individual sets of feasible market matches with respect to qualifications,
as measured by (TiF (z),Tim (z)), are unaffected by the tax rate changes.
Again, this stresses the fact that this is not a complete equilibrium
model. This fact should be kept in mind in the interpretation of the simu-
lation results.
One purpose of the simulation experiments is to examine the influ-
ence of certain tax reforms on labor supply, income levels and income in-
equality among households (married couples with or without children). The
. basic income concepts are gross income (Y) and disposable income (equal to
consumption C) defined as;
(6.2) 	Y = w h + wm hm + I + 12,
and
(6.3) 	 C 	 - S(wF h F ,wm h ,I 1 ),
where I 	and 12 are taxable and non-taxable non-labor family income, res-
pectively, and S is the tax function.
Income inequality is examined by employing a transfer sensitive in-
equality measure. This measure of inequality, denoted the A-coefficient, is
discussed in Aaberge (1986). The A-coefficient has a similar geometric
interpretation as the Gini-coefficient, but gives more weight to transfers
that occur in the lower part of the distribution. The maximum attainable
value of the A-coefficient is 1, which corresponds to the distribution
where one family has all income, while the minimum attainable value is 0,
which corresponds to perfect equality. The mathematical definition and some
other relevant information are given in Appendix 1.
The simulation of the model can be performed as follows:
Draw n points (say),
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fliF (z),Hm (z),Z(z)}, 	 z = 1,2,...,n.
Here {HF (z)} and {Hm (z)} are drawn from uniform distributions with
full- and part-time peaks and { (z)} are drawn from the extreme value dis-
tribut -ion, exp(-e-c ). Find the realized hours (HF (z),Hm (z)) given the wages
(wF ,wm ) by maximizing
ITO F (z) , Hm (z),wF wm ) + i(z)
with respect to z = 1,2,...,n. Repeat this procedure for every household in
the sample. When n is large this procedure yields results that are close to
an "exact" simulation of the model.
The simulation procedure we have followed in the present paper is a
refinement of the one described above and it is unbiased for finite n and
also more efficient. This procedure will be described and analyzed else-
where.
6.1. Lump-sum and proportional taxes on gross earnings
The personal income tax system in Sweden in 1981 was designed to
have a progressive structure. To a certain extent the redistributional
effect of this structure was, however, distorted by the rules of deduc-
tions. In fact, the tax system combined with the benefit system is not
uniformly progressive. The purpose of this section is to study effects on
labor supply and income distribution of replacing the 1981 tax rules by
proportional taxes on gross earnings and lump-sum taxes, respectively. The
proportional tax rate is derived under the constraint that the personal
income tax revenue (among those couples who work) should remain unchanged
and equal to the revenue in 1981. This tax rate is found to be approximate-
ly 32 per cent, which is 3 per cent points less than the actual tax level
in 1981. The lump-sum amounts are obtained from the conditions that each of
the households should have utility levels equal to their utility levels
under the 1981 rules.
The results of the three simulation experiments are displayed in
Tables 4 and 5. We start with commenting on the lump-sum case. Although it
is impossible to practice this system, it yields information about the
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upper limit for the personal income tax revenue. By definition all marginal
and distortive effects of taxation are removed. Therefore, lump-sum taxa-
tion should bring forward the labor supply potential in the economy. From
Table 4 we observe that hours supplied among females and among males in-
crease by 27 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively, relatively to the 1981
rules. The households gross incomes increase by 27 per cent, which indi-
cates the potential increase in earnings that can be obtained from tax re-
forms.
Table 4. Annual hours of work, gross earnings, gross income, taxes and dis-
posable income under three different tax regimes. Means
Annual 	 Gross 	 Gross 	 Taxes Disposable
Tax 	 hours 	 earnings 	 income 	 income
regime 	 of work 	 (SEK)
F 	 M 	 F 	 M 	 Households
1981 tax
rules 	 1 518 	 2 014 	 63 400 	 110 700 	 179 300 	 63 000 	 116 200
Propor-
tional
taxes 1 ) 	 1 678 	 2 209 	 72 000 	 124 200 	 201 400 	 63 000 	 138 400
Lump-
sum
taxes 2 ) 	 1 925 	 2 441 	 82 700 	 139 100 	 227 000 	 79 200 	 147 800
1) The proportional tax rate (approximately 32 per cent) on gross earnings
is obtained by simulating the model under the restriction of a constant
tax revenue equal to the revenue under the 1981 rules.
2) Individual lump-sum taxes are derived by simulating the model given that
each households utility level should be equal to the level under the
1981 rules.
Table 5 demonstrates that lump-sum taxation increases income in-
equality among households in spite of reduced differences in hours of work
and gross earnings among females.
From a practical point of view a more relevant tax reform is to
replace the 1981 rules by proportional taxes on gross earnings. By intro-
ducing this reform, we observe from table 4 that labor supply both among
females and males increase by approximately 10 per cent. Gross household
income increases by 12 per cent or about 46 per cent of the increase ob-
tained when the 1981 rules are replaced by lump-sum taxes.
From Table 5 we realize that the introduction of proportional tax-
ation increases the level of inequality in the distribution of disposable
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household income by 39 per cent (measured by the A-coefficient). If, alter-
natively the Gini-coefficient is applied, see Appendix 2, the increase is
estimated to be 49 per cent. This means that the central part of the dis-
tribution of disposable household income is more strongly affected by the
tax reform than the lower part of the distribution. The last column of
Table 5 gives the ratio between the A-inequalities of the distributions of
disposable and gross income and can be interpreted as an aggregate estimate
of the degree of progression.
Thus, the main conclusion so far is that if the 1981 rules are re-
placed by proportional taxes the economy will be stimulated at the expense
of increased income inequality.
Table 5. A-inequality* in distributions of annual hours of work, gross
earnings, gross income and disposable income under three different
tax regimes
Annual 	 Gross 	 Gross Dis- 	 Degree of
Tax 	 hours 	 earnings 	 income posable aggregate
regime 	 of work 	 income progression
F 	M	 F 	M	 Households
1981 tax 	 .318 	 .154 	 .390 	 .324 	 .258 	 .205 	 .79
rules 	 (.006) 	 .006) 	 .007) 	 (.006) 	 .005) 	 (.004)
Propor-
tional 	 .312 	 .143 	 .418 	 .351 	 .284 	 .284 	 1.00
taxes 	 (.006) 	 .005) 	 .007) 	 .006) 	 (.005) 	 .005)
Lump-
sum 	 .244 	 .153 	 .377 	 .371 	 .295 	 .256 	 .87
taxes 	 (.006) 	 (.004) 	 (.007) 	 .006) 	 (.005) 	 .004)
* Standard deviations in parenthesis.
6.2. Excess burden
In the discussion above we have ignored the fact that the costs of
increased efforts is a reduction in leisure. We therefore now discuss a
money measure of the changes in utility as a result of changes in the tax
system and estimate the cost taxation based on this measure.
Let K denote the level of equivalent variation of a household
defined by
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(6.3) 	 V(f 1 ,0) = V(fo ,K)
where
(6.4) V(f,K) = maxP. (f(HF (z)wF ,Hm (z)wm ,I) + K,HF (z),Hm (z)) + c(z)]
fo denotes the • 1981 rules, and f 1 denotes the above mentioned system of
Proportional taxes on gross earnings with a tax rate approximately equal to
32 per cent. V(f,K) is clearly the indirect utility function given wages
and tax rules.
Our measure of excess burden is the ratio of the mean level of
equivalent variations to the initial mean tax revenue.
Recall that the indirect utility is stochastic and its values can
be obtained from (6.4) by inserting the values of hours, wages and the
taste-shifter that correspond to the chosen match. Since the indirect
utility is random, so is K.
Below we report the simulation results regarding the excess burden
of taxation when the 1981 rules are compared to lump-sum taxes and to a
system of proportional taxes on gross earnings.
By aggregating the individual lump-sum taxes, we get a total tax
revenue of SEK 79 200 which is 26 per cent higher than the tax revenue
under the 1981 rules. Thus, the excess burden of taxation, when 1981 rules
are compared to lump-sum taxes, is 26 per cent. This burden is low compared
to the results for Norway given in Aaberge et.al. (1989). The excess burden
of the Norwegian 1979 tax system was estimated to 61 per cent. Consequently
the excess burden of taxation in Sweden indicates considerable less loss
from collecting taxes through the actual system than in Norway. The main
reason why the excess burden of taxation is lower in Sweden than in Norway
is differences in the contraints caused by taxes and hours restrictions.
The mean level of K relative to initial tax revenue is estimated to
be 16.7 per cent. This is by definition lower than the excess burden when
the 1981 rules are replaced by lump-sum taxes. By adding the compensation
payment to the initial taxes, it was found that this sum amounts to 93
per cent of the lump-sum transfers.
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Table . Equivalent variations* (K) for the 1981 rules versus proportional
taxes on wage earnings
Mean level
of K (SEK)























Standard deviation in parenthesis.
In order to examine the redistributional effect we consider those
loosing and those gaining from a switch to proportional taxation. Specifi-
cally we have estimated some key measures for these two groups. Table 7
displays the respective means for labor supply and income variables. We
observe that the majority of the households - 62 per cent - is gaining from
this tax reform. Both female and male members of these households have on
average higher wage rates than female and male members of the households
loosing from the tax reform. We observe that the households that are
gaining increase their annual hours of work relatively more - 12 versus 8
per cent - than the households that are loosing.
Table 7. Characteristics of those who gain from switching to proportional taxes (K>0) and those
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Table 8 gives some information about the mobility induced by the
switch to proportional taxation. Only 50 per cent of the 10 per cent
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in this 	 decile


















richest households under the 1981 rules still stay in this fraction of the
population after the tax-change. The corresponding result for the 10
per cent poorest is 64 per cent. Among the 10 per cent richest there are 72
per cent who gain from the tax reform, while 43 per cent of the 10 per cent
poorest gain from the tax reform. Those who gain among the poorest and
among the richest gain on average SEK 7 700 and SEK 45 900, respectively.
There are fewer loosers among the richest than among the poorest. However,
the richest loose on average more than twice the amount of the loss of the
loosers among the poorest.
Table 8. Flows from and equivalent variations in the lower and the upper 10
per cent of the distribution of disposable income when the 1981-
rules are replaced by proportional taxes

















0.72 	 45 900
	
0.28 	 -17 700
Tables 9 and 10 give some characteristics of the households who are
located in the 10 per cent lower and the 10 per cent upper parts of the
distribution of disposable income under the 1981 rules. The first line
gives the characteristics under the 1981 rules and the second line gives
the characteristics of the very same households under a system of propor-
tional taxes on gross earnings. The results in tables 9 and 10 show that
female and male members of the 10 per cent poorest households on average
increase their labor supply by 28 and 13 per cent, respectively. The corre-
sponding results for the 10 per cent richest households are an increase of
6 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. The implications of the increased
labor supply are higher disposable incomes both among poor and rich house-
holds. The poor households are stimulated both by positive substitution and
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income effects, while the rich households meet positive substitution
effects and negative income effects. However, among the majority of the
rich the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
Table 9. Characteristics of the 10 per cent poorest (disposable income)
households under the 1981-rules
Annual 	 Wage 	 Gross 	 Disposable
hours 	 earnings 	 household Taxes income




1981-rules 	 1 043 	 1 761 	 33 500 66 700 	 102 800 	 29 500 	 73 300
Proportional
taxes 	 1 336 	 1 983 44 700 77 100 	 124 500 39 000 85 500
Table 10. Characteristics of the 10 per cent richest households under the
1981-rules
Annual 	 Wage 	 Gross 	 Disposable
hours 	 earnings 	 household Taxes income




1981-rules 	 1 713 	 2 128 	 98 200 182 200 	 289 100 111 600 177 500
Proportional
taxes 	 1 814 2 388 107 200 208 800 324 700 101 500 223 200
7. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years there have been important developments in the eco-
nometric modeling methodology of labor supply. The most well known of these
new approaches is the Hausman type model of labor supply. The most impor-
tant and new aspect in this approach relative to previous analyses was the
treatment of the budget constraint. In most countries taxes are not uni-
formingly progressive with income which implies a non-convex budget set.
The purpose of the Hausman approach was to account for this non-convexity
when estimating labor supply functions. This approach has, however, only
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proved to be tractable when labor supply curves are linear or quadratic,
budget constraints are weakly non-convex and markets are free from imper-
fections. Moreover most of the Hausman type models have been estimated on
data sets in which paid taxes are not observed, but imputed from tax rules.
The present study tries to overcome some of these shortcomings
through a quite different approach which allows for rather complex non-con-
vex budget constraints 1 rather general and highly non-linear supply curves
and imperfect markets with latent institutional constraints. Moreover paid
rather than imputed taxes are used in estimating the model.
Estimates on Swedish data show that our approach gives a less
elastic labor supply than the results obtained in previous studies on
Swedish data based on the Hausman type approach as reported in studies by
Blomquist op cit. There are several factors contributing to this diffe-
rence. The specifications of the constraints and preferences differ but it
is hard to "calculate" the contribution from each of these components.
Despite the fact that labor supply is rather inelastic as measured by wage
elasticities, the response in labor supply of replacing the "present" tax
system in 1981 by a flat tax rate on wage earnings is clearly of some
importance. The corresponding costs of taxation is also substantial.
In an analogue study of the Norwegian labor supply we found 14bor
supply to be more elastic than in Sweden and consequently the burden of
taxation to be higher in Norway than in Sweden. There are several factors
contributing to this difference in the responsiveness pf labor supply to
changes in wages and tax rates. The following three aspects of the con-
straints facing the individuals in the two countries are important. First,
at the beginning of the 1980s the tax systems of the two countries differed
at one important point. In Norway there was an option of joint taxation
while in Sweden a corresponding option did not exist. Second, the leave of
absence rules when a woman gives birth to a child were and still are more
generous in Sweden than in Norway. For these and other reasons the partici-
pation rates and working hours were higher among females in Sweden than in
Norway. The data used to estimate the models differ substantial between the
two countries. In Sweden contracted hours were observed while in Norway
hours were obtained by dividing labor income by observed wage rates.
Estimates of an excess burden of taxation, ranging from 16 per cent
in Sweden to 48 per cent in Norway, at the beginning of the 1980s, indicate
that costs of taxation in Scandinavian countries have been quite large. And
it supports the view that the gain from changing the tax system towards
29
proportional taxes could be substantial. In Sweden this gain has to be
weighted against the social cost of increasing income inequality as re-
ported in table 5 above.
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APPENDIX 1. MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY
A common approach for measuring inequality in distributions of
income is to employ the Gini coefficient, which satisfies the principles of
scale invariance and transfers. The principle of scale invariance states
that inequality should remain unaffected if each income is altered by the
same proportion and it requires, therefore, the inequality measure to be
independent of the scale of measurement. The principle of transfers implies
that if a transfer of income takes place from a richer to a poorer person
without reversions of the relative positions, the inequality diminishes.
As is wellkonown, the Gini coefficient (G) is related to the Lorenz
curve (L) in the following way
1
(A.1) = f [1-2L(u)]du.
0
The Gini coefficient offers a method for ranking distributions and quati-
fying the differences in inequality between distributions. This strategy,
however, suffers from certain inconveniencies. Evidently, no single measure
can reflect all aspects of inequality of a distribution, only summarize it
to a certain extent. Consequently, it is important to have alternatives to
the Gini coefficient. As pointed out by Atkinson (1970), the Gini coeffi-
cient assigns more Weight to transfers in the centre of a unimodal distri-
bution that at the tails. As an alternative to the Gini coefficient, we
will employ an inequality measure (the A-coefficient) that assigns more
weight transfers at the lower tail than at the centre and the upper tail.
The A-coefficient, see Aaberge (1986), has a similar geometric interpreta-
tion and relation to the inequality curve M defined by
(A.2) m( u) _ E[XIX.q.-1 (u)1 
EX
0 	 u 	 1,
as the Gini coefficient has to the Lorenz curve. Here X has distribution







If X is an income variable, then 14(u) for a fixed u expresses the ratio
between the mean income of the poorest 100u per cent of the population and
the mean income of the population. As is well-known, the egalitarian line
of the Lorenz curve is the straight line joining the points (0.0) • and
(1.1). The egalitarian line of the M-curve is the horizontal line joining
the points (0.1) and (1.1). Thus, the universe of M-curves is bounded by a
unit square, while the universe of Lorentz curves is bounded by a triangle.
Therefore visually, there is a sharper distinction between two different
M-curves than between the two corresponding Lorenz curves. Note that the
M-curve will be equal to the diagonal line (M(u)=u) if and only if the
underlying distribution is uniform (0,a) for an arbitrary a. The A-coeffi-
cient then takes the value 0.5, while the maximum attainable value is 1 and
the minimum attainable value is O.
Note that M(u) = L(u)/u, which implies
(A.4) s [1 	 11111.1A.
O 	 u Ju"'
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APPENDIX 2. ESTIMATES OF INEQUALITY BASED ON THE GIN COEFFICIENT
In the tables below we have used a numbering which will facilitate
comparison with the corresponding tables for the A-coefficient. Therefore,
table G5 corresponds to table 5 and table G6 corresponds to table 6.
Table G5. G-inequality* in distributions of annual hours of work, gross

















F 	M	 F 	 M 	 Households
1981 tax 	 .198 	 .076 	 .266 	 .229 	 .181 	 .138 	 .76
rules 	 (.004)
	
(.003) 	 .006) 	 (.005) 	 (.004) (.003)
Propor-
tional 	 .185 	 .088 	 .291 	 .259 	 .205 	 .205 	 1.00
taxes
	
(.004) 	 (.003) 	 (.006) 	 (.005) 	 .004) (.004)
Lump-
sum 	 .139 	 .107 	 .264 	 .280 	 .216 	 .185 	 .86
taxes
	
(.004) 	 (.002) 	 (.007) 	 .005) 	 .004) 	 .003)
* Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table G6. Equivalent variations* (K) for the 1981-rules versus proportional
taxes on wage earnings
Mean level
of K (SEK)






















* Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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